Tracking four empirical indicators historically associated with political extremism and democratic backsliding
Academic research has identified several measurable factors that correlate with the rise of extremist movements and democratic erosion. This index tracks four of these indicators in the United States: economic distress, declining national pride, demographic change rates, and institutional trust.[1]
The goal is not to predict specific outcomes, but to provide a data-driven snapshot of conditions that historically precede political instability. Each component draws from peer-reviewed research on the causes of populist surges and authoritarian backsliding.[2]
The composite index currently registers at 77.8 (out of 100), placing it in the "elevated risk" category. Notably, this is not driven by economic factors—unemployment remains relatively low at 4.4%.[3] Instead, the elevated reading comes from historic lows in national pride[4] and institutional trust,[5] combined with demographic change rates at their highest in over a century.[6]
This index combines four factors identified by academic meta-analyses as correlates of extremist political movements:
These weights reflect the author's judgment, informed by the empirical literature rather than derived from a single formal variance decomposition. The meta-analysis by Scheiring et al. (2024) synthesizes causal evidence that economic shocks are a substantial but partial driver of populist voting, alongside cultural and institutional factors; it does not itself assign fixed percentage weights to these categories.[1] The specific weighting used here is therefore illustrative, chosen so that economic distress carries the largest single share while allowing status, demographic, and institutional-trust factors to jointly dominate—consistent with findings that non-economic drivers can outweigh economic ones.[8]
This index has significant limitations that should inform how the data is interpreted:
Proxy limitations: The "demographic change rate" component measures the pace of foreign-born population change, not attitudes toward immigration. These can diverge significantly—some research suggests that perception of demographic threat matters more than actual demographic change.[11]
Data gaps: Pre-2001 national pride data is estimated based on historical context, as Gallup polling on this specific question began in 2001.[4] These estimates introduce additional uncertainty.
Context dependency: The same index value can mean different things in different institutional contexts. A country with strong independent judiciary and free press faces different risks than one without these safeguards.
Current: 4.4% (September 2025)[3] — Relatively low by historical standards. Economic factors are not the primary driver of current elevated readings.
2025: 41% "extremely proud," with combined "extremely/very proud" at 58%[4]—then a further decline in June 2026 to 33% "extremely proud" and 53% combined, a 25-year record low.[13] Down from 87% combined in 2001.
Current: 14.3% (2023 Census/ACS estimate)[6] — the highest in over a century, and rising: the 2024 ACS put the share near 14.8%,[14] while CPS-based estimates reached roughly 15.8% by January 2025, at or above the historical peaks of 1890 and 1910.[15] Note: This measures demographic change rate, not attitudes.
Current: ~17% (2025)[5] — Near historic lows. Notably, trust has become highly partisan: 26% of Republicans and Republican-leaners vs. 9% of Democrats and Democratic-leaners trust the federal government.
Unlike the Great Depression or 2008 financial crisis, current elevated readings are not driven by unemployment (which remains at 4.4%). Instead, the primary drivers are:
This pattern aligns with research showing status threat and cultural factors can be stronger drivers of populist support than economic hardship.[8][12]
| Period | Index | Primary Drivers | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1964 | 37.5 | High trust (77%), strong pride | Democratic stability |
| 1974 (Watergate) | 60.4 | Trust collapse (36%), Vietnam | Institutional reform |
| 1980 (Stagflation) | 70.7 | High unemployment (7.1%), low trust (25%) | Political realignment |
| 2009 (Great Recession) | 72.0 | Peak unemployment (9.3%) | Tea Party movement |
| 2020 (Pandemic) | 84.3 | High unemployment (8.1%), low trust | Heightened polarization |
| 2025 (Current) | 77.8 | Historic low pride/trust, demographic change | TBD |
Several important factors are not captured in this composite index:
These factors can significantly modify how the measured conditions translate into political outcomes. A high index value in a country with strong institutions may pose less risk than a moderate value in a country with weak institutions.
[1] Scheiring, G., Serrano-Alarcón, M., Moise, A., McNamara, C., & Stuckler, D. (2024). "The Populist Backlash Against Globalization: A Meta-Analysis of the Causal Evidence." British Journal of Political Science, 54(3). Cambridge Core
[2] Funke, M., Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). "Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870-2014." European Economic Review, 88, 227-260.
[3] Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Employment Situation Summary" (September 2025). BLS.gov
[4] Gallup. "American Pride Slips to New Low" (July 2025). news.gallup.com
[5] Pew Research Center. "Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025" (December 2025). pewresearch.org
[6] U.S. Census Bureau. "Foreign-Born Population in the United States." census.gov
[7] Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2018). "The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe." American Journal of Political Science, 62(4), 936-953.
[8] Mutz, D. C. (2018). "Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote." PNAS, 115(19), E4330-E4339.
[9] Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press.
[10] Citrin, J., & Stoker, L. (2018). "Political Trust in a Cynical Age." Annual Review of Political Science, 21, 49-70.
[11] Kaufmann, E. (2019). Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities. Abrams Press.
[12] Margalit, Y. (2019). "Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(4), 152-170.
[13] Gallup. "American Pride Falls to 25-Year Record Low" (June 2026). news.gallup.com
[14] Associated Press / Voice of America. "Share of foreign-born people in US is at highest rate in over a century, survey says" (2024). voanews.com
[15] Center for Immigration Studies. "Foreign-Born Number and Share of U.S. Population at All-Time Highs, January 2025." cis.org
Last updated: July 13, 2026 | Part of the Horse Energy analysis series on economic distribution and democratic stability