Tracking the four key ingredients that historically precede democratic collapse and extremist movements
The United States is currently registering its highest sustained risk level in the modern measurement period (1958-2025), surpassing even the 2008 financial crisis. This is driven not by economic factors, but by historic lows in national pride and institutional trust combined with demographic change anxiety.
This index combines four factors identified by academic research as precursors to extremist movements:
Weights based on meta-analysis of 36 academic studies (Scheiring et al., 2024) showing economic factors explain ~33% of populist surges, with cultural and institutional factors comprising the remaining ~67%.
Current: 4.2% - Relatively low. Economic factor is not currently driving risk.
Current: 38% "extremely proud" - Down 32 points from 2003 peak. Historic low, major risk driver.
Current: 14.5% - At historic peak levels (higher than 1920), rapid change creates anxiety.
Current: 22% - Down 55 points from 1964 peak. Near historic lows, major risk driver.
Unlike the Great Depression or 2008 financial crisis, current extreme risk levels are NOT driven by unemployment (which remains low at 4.2%). Instead, risk is driven by:
This pattern aligns with research showing status threat and cultural backlash can be stronger drivers than economics (Mutz, 2018; Margalit, 2019).
Unemployment: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) for historical data
National Pride: Gallup polling (2001-2025), pre-2001 estimates based on historical context
Foreign-Born Population: U.S. Census Bureau historical statistics, Migration Policy Institute
Trust in Government: Pew Research Center (1958-2024), American National Election Studies
• Scheiring, G., Molnár, G., Geiger, B. B., & Szabó, L. (2024). The Populist Backlash Against Globalization: A Meta-Analysis of the Causal Evidence. British Journal of Political Science.
• Funke, M., Schularick, M., & Trebesch, C. (2016). Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870-2014. European Economic Review.
• Mutz, D. C. (2018). Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote. PNAS, 115(19).
• Margalit, Y. (2019). Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(4).
• Gozgor, G. (2022). The Role of Economic Uncertainty in the Rise of EU Populism. Public Choice, 190(1).
Last updated: October 2025 | Part of the Horse Energy analysis series on economic distribution and democratic stability